NXS-GRX · XT-02 · Exponential technology series
Cyber and cyber-physical systems
Threats to operational technology, industrial control and cyber-physical systems across energy, water, health, ports and logistics.
Page GRX-SER-XT-02Edition Baseline Edition 2026Evidence close 2026-09-30Subject NXS-GRX proposedNexus Reports XT-02 (planned)Values not yet publishedSnapshot 31a753f76
FIG 1 · Series at a glance
Domain indices
1
Cyber risk
Indicators
83
3 index domains
Hazard families
19
Information and cyber-physical systems · Built systems
Methods
83
Cyber, AI and frontier technology · Critical infrastructure and industrial systems
1
domain indices
83
indicators in scope
2
hazard domains
4
client groups
01Scope
Scope and questions
The subject of this index is proposed by NXS-GRX (canonical data, provenance and risk); the Nexus Reports edition with the same code sets its own subject at commissioning, and any difference is recorded as a crosswalk.
- Which essential services expose control systems?
- How fast could a cyber-physical incident cascade?
- Where is recovery capacity weakest?
02Construction
Domain indices to the series index
The series index is the expert-weighted geometric mean of its domain indices, with the intervals and class rule of the methodology.
computation
How the Cyber and cyber-physical systems index is builtGraph
01Domain indices
02Series index
03Readings
100%
List
- Cyber riskDomain index · IDX · CYBIndex of cyber incident pressure, digital dependence and the lack of cyber capability on a 0-10 scale, higher meaning riskier.
- Cyber and cyber-physical systems indexSeries index · SERIES · XT-02Threats to operational technology, industrial control and cyber-physical systems across energy, water, health, ports and logistics.
- Country readingsOutput · OUTPUT · 195 profilesPublished with intervals and classes when the edition is released.
- Regional readingsOutput · OUTPUT · 5 regionsPublished with intervals and classes when the edition is released.
- Global readingOutput · OUTPUT · population or exposure weightedPublished with intervals and classes when the edition is released.
Not runIn progressDone
03Indices
Domain indices in this series
NXS-GRX · XT-02 · 195 profiles · 0–10 scale
Cyber and cyber-physical systems index, world
—
Values publish with the edition; the interval, class and change appear here.
| Index | Value | Change | Change % | 90% interval | Class · probability | Trend | Range |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cyber riskNXS-GRX · CYB | — | — | — | — | — |
Domains read: Cyber and digital, Infrastructure, Energy.
04Indicators
83 indicators in scope
Every indicator whose primary or secondary domain is in scope, with unit, levels and crosswalks to source code lists.
FIG 3 · Indicators in scope, by domain and sub-domain
| Indicator | Domain | Sub-domain | Component | Unit | Levels | Crosswalks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fuel imports, share of merchandise importsIND.ECO.concentration.fuel_import_share | ECO | Export and import concentration | vulnerability | % | COUNTRY | WB_WDI TM.VAL.FUEL.ZS.UN |
| Net import reliance for critical mineralsIND.ECO.concentration.critical_minerals_import_reliance | ECO | Export and import concentration | vulnerability | % | COUNTRY | |
| Seaborne trade exposed to maritime chokepointsIND.ECO.supply_chain.chokepoint_exposure | ECO | Supply-chain exposure | exposure | % | COUNTRY | |
| Total greenhouse gas emissions excluding LULUCFIND.CLI.emissions.ghg_total | CLI | Emissions | exposure | Mt/a | COUNTRY | WB_WDI EN.GHG.ALL.MT.CE.AR5 SDG 13.2.2 |
| Carbon intensity of GDPIND.CLI.emissions.carbon_intensity_gdp | CLI | Emissions | exposure | kg/[USD] | COUNTRY | WB_WDI EN.GHG.CO2.RT.GDP.KD SDG 9.4.1 |
| Explicit fossil-fuel subsidies, share of GDPIND.CLI.transition.fossil_fuel_subsidies.gdp | CLI | Transition exposure | exposure | % | COUNTRY | |
| Flood protection design standardIND.HAZ.flood.flood_protection_standard | HAZ | Flood | coping capacity | a | COUNTRY, ADM1, CITY, SITE | |
| Built-up surface areaIND.HAZ.exposure.built_up_area | HAZ | Exposure | context | km2 | COUNTRY, ADM1, ADM2, CITY, GRID | |
| Built-up area in high-hazard zonesIND.HAZ.exposure.built_up_exposed | HAZ | Exposure | exposure | km2 | COUNTRY, ADM1, ADM2, CITY, GRID | |
| Road densityIND.ENV.land.road_density | ENV | Land and forests | hazard | km/km2 | COUNTRY, ADM1, ADM2, CITY, GRID | |
| Municipal solid waste managed in controlled facilitiesIND.ENV.pollution.msw_controlled_management.share | ENV | Pollution and waste | coping capacity | % | COUNTRY, CITY | SDG 11.6.1 EPI MSW |
| Level of water stressIND.WAT.stress.water_stress | WAT | Water stress | hazard | % | COUNTRY, ADM1 | SDG 6.4.2 WB_WDI ER.H2O.FWST.ZS |
| Wastewater flows safely treatedIND.WAT.quality.wastewater_safely_treated.share | WAT | Water quality | coping capacity | % | COUNTRY, CITY | SDG 6.3.1 EPI WWT |
| GDP in GNSS-dependent activities, shareIND.SPC.dependence.gnss_dependent_gdp.share | SPC | Space-service dependence | exposure | % | COUNTRY, PORTFOLIO | UNDRR_HIPS_2025 ET0102 |
| Critical services relying on satellites without backup, shareIND.SPC.dependence.satellite_service_exposure.share | SPC | Space-service dependence | vulnerability | % | COUNTRY | |
| High-voltage grid in high geoelectric hazard zones, shareIND.SPC.dependence.grid_gic_exposure.share | SPC | Space-service dependence | exposure | % | COUNTRY, ADM1 | |
| Travel time to the nearest health facilityIND.HLT.system.health_facility_travel_time | HLT | Health system capacity | vulnerability | min | COUNTRY, ADM1, ADM2, CITY, GRID | |
| Urban population, share of totalIND.DEM.urbanisation.urban_share | DEM | Urbanisation | context | % | COUNTRY | WB_WDI SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS |
| Urban population growthIND.DEM.urbanisation.urban_growth | DEM | Urbanisation | vulnerability | % | COUNTRY | WB_WDI SP.URB.GROW |
| Urban population living in slumsIND.DEM.urbanisation.slum_share | DEM | Urbanisation | vulnerability | % | COUNTRY | WB_WDI EN.POP.SLUM.UR.ZS SDG 11.1.1 |
| Population with access to electricityIND.ENE.access.electricity_access | ENE | Access | vulnerability | % | COUNTRY, ADM1 | SDG 7.1.1 WB_WDI EG.ELC.ACCS.ZS |
| Population relying primarily on clean cooking fuels and technologiesIND.ENE.access.clean_cooking | ENE | Access | vulnerability | % | COUNTRY, ADM1 | SDG 7.1.2 WB_WDI EG.CFT.ACCS.ZS |
| Electricity consumption per capitaIND.ENE.access.electricity_consumption.pc | ENE | Access | context | kW.h/a/{person} | COUNTRY | WB_WDI EG.USE.ELEC.KH.PC |
| Renewable share of total final energy consumptionIND.ENE.mix.renewable_share_tfec | ENE | Energy mix | adaptive capacity | % | COUNTRY | SDG 7.2.1 WB_WDI EG.FEC.RNEW.ZS |
| Primary energy intensity of GDPIND.ENE.mix.energy_intensity | ENE | Energy mix | vulnerability | MJ/[USD] | COUNTRY | SDG 7.3.1 WB_WDI EG.EGY.PRIM.PP.KD |
| Electricity generation-mix concentrationIND.ENE.mix.generation_concentration | ENE | Energy mix | vulnerability | 1 | COUNTRY | |
| Fossil share of electricity generationIND.ENE.mix.fossil_electricity_share | ENE | Energy mix | vulnerability | % | COUNTRY | WB_WDI EG.ELC.FOSL.ZS |
| Installed renewable generating capacity per capitaIND.ENE.mix.renewable_capacity.pc | ENE | Energy mix | adaptive capacity | W/{person} | COUNTRY | SDG 7.b.1 |
| Water-dependent electricity generation, shareIND.ENE.mix.water_dependent_generation.share | ENE | Energy mix | vulnerability | % | COUNTRY, ADM1 | |
| Net energy import dependenceIND.ENE.security.net_energy_imports | ENE | Supply security and import dependence | exposure | % | COUNTRY | WB_WDI EG.IMP.CONS.ZS |
| Fuel import bill, share of exports of goods and servicesIND.ENE.security.fuel_import_bill.exports | ENE | Supply security and import dependence | vulnerability | % | COUNTRY | WB_WDI TM.VAL.FUEL.ZS.UN |
| Crude oil and products import supplier concentrationIND.ENE.security.oil_import_concentration | ENE | Supply security and import dependence | vulnerability | 1 | COUNTRY | |
| Natural gas import supplier concentrationIND.ENE.security.gas_import_concentration | ENE | Supply security and import dependence | vulnerability | 1 | COUNTRY | |
| Coal import supplier concentrationIND.ENE.security.coal_import_concentration | ENE | Supply security and import dependence | vulnerability | 1 | COUNTRY | |
| Oil stocks in days of net importsIND.ENE.security.strategic_oil_stocks | ENE | Supply security and import dependence | coping capacity | d | COUNTRY | |
| Power outages experienced by firms in a typical monthIND.ENE.reliability.firm_power_outages | ENE | Reliability | vulnerability | /mo | COUNTRY | WB_WDI IC.ELC.OUTG |
| Value lost to electrical outages, share of firm salesIND.ENE.reliability.outage_sales_loss | ENE | Reliability | impact | % | COUNTRY | WB_WDI IC.FRM.OUTG.ZS |
| System average interruption duration (SAIDI)IND.ENE.reliability.saidi | ENE | Reliability | vulnerability | h/a | COUNTRY, ADM1, CITY | ISO_37120 ISO 37120:2018 |
| System average interruption frequency (SAIFI)IND.ENE.reliability.saifi | ENE | Reliability | vulnerability | /a | COUNTRY, ADM1, CITY | ISO_37120 ISO 37120:2018 |
| Electric power transmission and distribution lossesIND.ENE.reliability.td_losses | ENE | Reliability | vulnerability | % | COUNTRY | WB_WDI EG.ELC.LOSS.ZS |
| Heating and cooling degree daysIND.ENE.reliability.thermal_demand_degree_days | ENE | Reliability | hazard | K.d/a | COUNTRY, ADM1, CITY, GRID | |
| Critical-mineral import supplier concentrationIND.ENE.minerals.critical_mineral_import_concentration | ENE | Critical minerals | vulnerability | 1 | COUNTRY | |
| Largest single supplier share of critical-mineral importsIND.ENE.minerals.critical_mineral_top_supplier_share | ENE | Critical minerals | vulnerability | % | COUNTRY | |
| Rural population within 2 km of an all-season roadIND.INF.transport.rural_road_access | INF | Transport | coping capacity | % | COUNTRY, ADM1 | SDG 9.1.1 |
| Logistics performanceIND.INF.transport.logistics_performance | INF | Transport | coping capacity | {score} | COUNTRY | WB_WDI LP.LPI.OVRL.XQ |
| Liner shipping connectivity relative to the frontierIND.INF.transport.liner_shipping_connectivity | INF | Transport | coping capacity | % | COUNTRY | WB_WDI IS.SHP.GCNW.XQ |
| Air passengers carried per capitaIND.INF.transport.air_passengers.pc | INF | Transport | coping capacity | {passengers}/a/{person} | COUNTRY | WB_WDI IS.AIR.PSGR |
| Urban population with convenient access to public transportIND.INF.transport.public_transport_access | INF | Transport | coping capacity | % | CITY, ADM1, COUNTRY | SDG 11.2.1 ISO_37120 ISO 37120:2018 |
| Road and rail network in high-hazard zones, shareIND.INF.transport.network_exposed.share | INF | Transport | exposure | % | COUNTRY, ADM1, ADM2, CITY, GRID | |
| Individuals using the InternetIND.INF.digital.internet_users | INF | Digital connectivity | coping capacity | % | COUNTRY, ADM1, CITY | SDG 17.8.1 WB_WDI IT.NET.USER.ZS |
| Population covered by a mobile network, by technologyIND.INF.digital.mobile_network_coverage | INF | Digital connectivity | coping capacity | % | COUNTRY, ADM1 | SDG 9.c.1 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitantsIND.INF.digital.fixed_broadband | INF | Digital connectivity | coping capacity | /10*2 | COUNTRY, ADM1 | SDG 17.6.1 WB_WDI IT.NET.BBND.P2 |
| International connectivity route redundancyIND.INF.digital.international_connectivity_redundancy | INF | Digital connectivity | coping capacity | 1 | COUNTRY | |
| Hours of national-scale internet disruptionIND.INF.digital.internet_disruption_hours | INF | Digital connectivity | impact | h/a | COUNTRY | |
| Power grid resilienceIND.INF.utilities.power_grid_resilience | INF | Utilities | coping capacity | {score} | COUNTRY, ADM1, CITY | ISO_37123 ISO 37123:2019 |
| Water supply network resilienceIND.INF.utilities.water_network_resilience | INF | Utilities | coping capacity | {score} | COUNTRY, ADM1, CITY | ISO_37123 ISO 37123:2019 |
| Critical facilities with 72-hour back-up powerIND.INF.utilities.critical_facility_backup_power | INF | Utilities | coping capacity | % | COUNTRY, ADM1, CITY | ISO_37123 ISO 37123:2019 |
| Water supply assets in high-hazard zones, shareIND.INF.utilities.water_assets_exposed.share | INF | Utilities | exposure | % | COUNTRY, ADM1, ADM2, CITY, GRID | |
| Power generation and grid assets in high-hazard zones, shareIND.INF.utilities.power_assets_exposed.share | INF | Utilities | exposure | % | COUNTRY, ADM1, ADM2, CITY, GRID | |
| Lifeline facilities in high-hazard zones, shareIND.INF.utilities.lifeline_facilities_exposed.share | INF | Utilities | exposure | % | COUNTRY, ADM1, ADM2, CITY, GRID | |
| Infrastructure investment gap, share of GDPIND.INF.utilities.infrastructure_investment_gap.gdp | INF | Utilities | vulnerability | % | COUNTRY | |
| City electricity interruption hours per customerIND.INF.urban.power_interruption_hours | INF | Urban systems | vulnerability | h/a | CITY | ISO_37120 ISO 37120:2018 |
| Critical infrastructure units damaged or destroyed by disastersIND.INF.disruption.critical_infrastructure_damage | INF | Service disruption | impact | 1 | COUNTRY, ADM1 | SENDAI D-1 SDG 11.5.2 |
| Health facilities damaged or destroyed by disastersIND.INF.disruption.health_facilities_damaged | INF | Service disruption | impact | 1 | COUNTRY, ADM1 | SENDAI D-2 |
| Educational facilities damaged or destroyed by disastersIND.INF.disruption.education_facilities_damaged | INF | Service disruption | impact | 1 | COUNTRY, ADM1 | SENDAI D-3 |
| Disruptions to basic services attributed to disastersIND.INF.disruption.basic_service_disruptions | INF | Service disruption | impact | 1 | COUNTRY, ADM1 | SENDAI D-5 |
| Direct economic loss to critical infrastructure, share of GDPIND.INF.disruption.critical_infrastructure_loss.gdp | INF | Service disruption | impact | % | COUNTRY, ADM1 | SENDAI C-5 |
| ITU Global Cybersecurity Index scoreIND.CYB.capability.gci_score | CYB | Cyber capability | coping capacity | {score} | COUNTRY | ITU_GCI Overall score |
| ITU Global Cybersecurity Index tierIND.CYB.capability.gci_tier | CYB | Cyber capability | vulnerability | {class} | COUNTRY | ITU_GCI Tier |
| ITU GCI legal measures pillarIND.CYB.capability.gci_legal | CYB | Cyber capability | coping capacity | {score} | COUNTRY | ITU_GCI Legal Measures |
| ITU GCI technical measures pillarIND.CYB.capability.gci_technical | CYB | Cyber capability | coping capacity | {score} | COUNTRY | ITU_GCI Technical Measures |
| ITU GCI organizational measures pillarIND.CYB.capability.gci_organizational | CYB | Cyber capability | coping capacity | {score} | COUNTRY | ITU_GCI Organizational Measures |
| ITU GCI capacity development measures pillarIND.CYB.capability.gci_capacity_development | CYB | Cyber capability | adaptive capacity | {score} | COUNTRY | ITU_GCI Capacity Development Measures |
| ITU GCI cooperation measures pillarIND.CYB.capability.gci_cooperation | CYB | Cyber capability | coping capacity | {score} | COUNTRY | ITU_GCI Cooperation Measures |
| National computer incident response team in operationIND.CYB.capability.national_cert | CYB | Cyber capability | coping capacity | {bool} | COUNTRY | ITU_GCI Technical Measures |
| Data protection and privacy legislation in forceIND.CYB.capability.data_protection_law | CYB | Cyber capability | coping capacity | {bool} | COUNTRY | ITU_GCI Legal Measures |
| Significant cyber incidents per million populationIND.CYB.incidents.significant_incident_rate | CYB | Incidents | hazard | /10*6/a | COUNTRY | |
| Cyber incidents disrupting critical servicesIND.CYB.incidents.critical_sector_incidents | CYB | Incidents | impact | 1 | COUNTRY | |
| ICT services value added, share of GDPIND.CYB.dependence.ict_services_share.gdp | CYB | Digital dependence | exposure | % | COUNTRY | WB_WDI BX.GSR.CCIS.ZS |
| E-government developmentIND.CYB.dependence.egovernment_development | CYB | Digital dependence | exposure | {score} | COUNTRY | |
| Cloud infrastructure provider concentrationIND.TEC.concentration.cloud_provider_concentration | TEC | Concentration and dependence | vulnerability | 1 | COUNTRY | |
| AI compute capacity under foreign or single-provider controlIND.TEC.ai.ai_compute_foreign_control | TEC | Artificial intelligence | vulnerability | % | COUNTRY | |
| Population within 15 minutes of emergency servicesIND.CRS.response.emergency_service_access | CRS | Response capacity | coping capacity | % | COUNTRY, ADM1, CITY | ISO_37120 ISO 37120:2018 |
05Hazards
Hazard families this series reads
families, each crosswalked to the UNDRR–ISC Hazard Information Profiles (2025) where a profile exists.
FIG 4 · Hazard families this series reads
| Family | Domain | Hazards | Count |
|---|---|---|---|
| Malicious compromise | Information and cyber-physical systems | Malware outbreak, Ransomware attack, Data breach, Persistent intrusion, Denial-of-service attack, Software or hardware supply-chain compromise, Social-engineering campaign, Online harassment campaign … | 9 |
| Information-integrity attacks | Information and cyber-physical systems | Disinformation campaign, Data and model integrity attack, Election infrastructure attack, Public record tampering, Misinformation surge and infodemic, Hazardous information disclosure | 6 |
| Cyber-physical disruption | Information and cyber-physical systems | Industrial control system compromise, Power-grid cyberattack, Transport control-system attack, Health-system cyberattack, Medical device compromise, Water utility cyberattack, Building systems compromise, Mass connected-device manipulation … | 11 |
| Signal and platform disruption | Information and cyber-physical systems | Satellite-navigation disruption, Major cloud or platform outage, Internet routing or naming failure, Subsea cable damage, Payment system outage, Radio-spectrum interference, Digital public infrastructure failure | 7 |
| Identity, trust and cryptographic failure | Information and cyber-physical systems | Identity provider compromise, Signing key or certificate compromise, Certificate or credential expiry outage, Cryptographic algorithm or implementation break, Mass account takeover, National digital identity system failure | 6 |
| Systemic cyber events | Information and cyber-physical systems | Defective update mass outage, Mass vulnerability exploitation, Connected-device botnet, Managed service provider compromise, Firmware or hardware backdoor, Insider threat, Cyber theft from financial infrastructure, Irrecoverable data loss … | 9 |
| Structural and civil failure | Built systems | Building collapse, Facade and cladding failure, Non-building structure failure, Bridge failure, Tunnel failure, Dam failure, Levee breach, Pipeline rupture | 8 |
| Utility and communication network outage | Built systems | Widespread power outage, Water supply failure, Sewer and drain failure, Gas supply network failure, Telecommunications outage, Emergency communications failure | 6 |
| Transport accidents | Built systems | Air transport accident, Maritime accident, Inland waterway accident, Rail accident, Road crash | 5 |
| Industrial and process accidents | Built systems | Industrial explosion, Reactive chemical store explosion, Industrial fire, Building and urban fire, Explosives accident, Mine accident, Oil and gas extraction accident, Battery thermal runaway fire … | 15 |
| Energy system instability and shortfall | Built systems | Low-inertia grid instability, System frequency collapse, Voltage collapse, Mass inverter disconnection, Grid power oscillation, Generation adequacy shortfall, Low wind and solar energy drought, Drought-driven hydropower shortfall … | 22 |
| Water and wastewater system failure | Built systems | Wastewater treatment plant failure, Distribution network contamination intrusion, Water treatment dosing error, Prolonged drinking-water advisory, Desalination plant outage, Raw-water intake loss, Chronic distribution leakage, Intermittent piped supply … | 9 |
| Telecom and data-centre failure | Built systems | Data-centre outage, Data-centre fire, Mobile or fixed core network failure, Terrestrial fibre backbone cut, Internet exchange or landing hub failure, Time and synchronisation failure, Telecom backup power exhaustion, Broadcast transmission loss | 8 |
| Space-based service loss | Built systems | Navigation satellite system fault, Satellite communications outage, Weather and Earth-observation satellite gap, Satellite ground segment failure | 4 |
| Seabed infrastructure damage | Built systems | Subsea pipeline damage, Subsea power cable damage, Covert seabed infrastructure sabotage | 3 |
| Transport network disruption | Built systems | Air traffic management failure, Large-scale airspace closure, Rail network outage, Heat-induced track buckling, Strategic road network closure, Low-water navigation restriction, Navigation lock or canal structure failure, Dangerous goods transport accident … | 12 |
| Food system infrastructure failure | Built systems | Food storage loss, Irrigation system failure, Food processing bottleneck, Strategic food reserve depletion, Loss of energy for food production | 5 |
| Urban and building-stock stress | Built systems | Building overheating, Seismically and structurally vulnerable stock, Defective building material in use, Construction and temporary works collapse, Tunnelling and excavation ground damage, High-rise evacuation failure | 6 |
| Ageing and degraded infrastructure | Built systems | Infrastructure deterioration, Deferred maintenance backlog, Reinforced concrete deterioration, Metal fatigue cracking, Ageing dam and reservoir stock, Legacy technology obsolescence, Infrastructure skills shortage | 7 |
06Coupling
How shocks cascade across systems
FIG 5 · Expected direct couplings between systems (row affects column)
| WAT | ENE | FOO | HLT | BIO | FIN | TRD | INF | DIG | SEC | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Water | ||||||||||
| Energy | ||||||||||
| Food | ||||||||||
| Health | ||||||||||
| Biodiversity | ||||||||||
| Finance | ||||||||||
| Trade | ||||||||||
| Infrastructure | ||||||||||
| Digital | ||||||||||
| Security |
Weak expected couplingModerate expected couplingStrong expected coupling
FIG 6 · Simulator: how a shock cascades across systems
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07Methods
Method libraries
Each method has a reference implementation or declares the specialist model, data or adapter it still needs; none is promoted beyond its evidence.
56 methods
Cyber, AI and frontier technology
Cyber Attack Surface · Exploitability · Threat Likelihood · Cyber Asset Criticality · Intrusion Propagation · Ransomware Risk · Identity Compromise …
27 methods
Critical infrastructure and industrial systems
Asset Reliability · Process Safety · HAZOP · FMEA FMECA · Industrial Fault Tree · Industrial Event Tree · LOPA …
08Users
Who uses it
Governments and national risk agencies
Prioritise prevention and preparedness; Plan with subnational layers; Track Sendai targets; Co-develop a national index
Companies and supply chains
Screen sites and suppliers; Watch chokepoints and pulse; Read country context
Insurers, reinsurers and risk pools
Read hazard, exposure and protection-gap context; Run scenario and tail analytics; Study parametric index design questions
Regulators, supervisors and central banks
Design supervisory scenarios; Read systemic coupling; Replicate methods
09Reports
Nexus Reports
- Edition code
XT-02- Edition status
- planned
- Subject
- Set by Nexus Reports at commissioning
10Cite
Cite and reuse
GCRI Canada (2026). The Global Risks Index (NXS-GRX): Cyber and cyber-physical systems series (GRX-SER-XT-02), Baseline Edition 2026. Preparatory working draft. https://risksindex.com/series/xt-02/ UNI NXS-GRX-AR-000089.
- Series key
grix:SER.XT-02:{ISO3}:{YEAR}:A- Domain keys
nis:IDX.CYB.capability.cyber_risk:{ISO3}:{YEAR}:A
Every country reads this series
Each country profile carries the domain indices this series is built from.
Status
The methodology, structure and definitions of The Global Risks Index are a preparatory working draft (2026), circulated for review and comment and not for implementation. No value appears until an edition is released from a governed evidence cut; values then carry intervals, classes, sources and their correction pathway. Simulators run the published methods on numbers you choose and never show a NXS-GRX value.
What NXS-GRX is not
NXS-GRX is research and risk-analytics information. It is not a credit or ESG rating and uses no rating scale, not a benchmark for financial instruments, not official statistics, not an emergency warning or official classification, and not advice. It must not be used to evaluate natural persons. Risk classes are bands on a published scale, never rankings of countries or people.
Institutions and sources
The Nexus Consortium is stewarded by three independent not-for-profit institutions: GCRI Canada as Lead Institution, Consortium Secretariat and lead contracting organization, The Global Risks Forum (GRF) and The Global Risks Alliance (GRA). Technology, infrastructure and service providers work with the Consortium at arm's length under written agreements, like every other external party in the public-private-planet model, and hold no role in its stewardship.
Every value carries the attribution of its sources, which keep their own licences. External names are cited for interoperability only. Nexus-authored text is intended for CC BY 4.0 on release.
Avis en français
La méthodologie et les définitions du NXS-GRX sont un projet de travail préparatoire (2026). Le NXS-GRX est une information de recherche et d'analyse des risques : ni notation, ni indice de référence financier, ni statistique officielle, ni alerte, ni conseil. Les classes de risque sont des bandes sur une échelle publiée, non des classements.