NXS-GRX · XT-07 · Exponential technology series
Earth observation and space systems
Dependency on satellites for navigation, communications and observation; orbital congestion, debris and space-weather exposure.
Page GRX-SER-XT-07Edition Baseline Edition 2026Evidence close 2026-09-30Subject NXS-GRX proposedNexus Reports XT-07 (planned)Values not yet publishedSnapshot 31a753f76
FIG 1 · Series at a glance
Domain indices
1
Space-weather exposure
Indicators
56
3 index domains
Hazard families
18
Space and near-Earth · Frontier and exponential technology
Methods
64
Hazard science · Critical infrastructure and industrial systems
1
domain indices
56
indicators in scope
2
hazard domains
3
client groups
01Scope
Scope and questions
The subject of this index is proposed by NXS-GRX (canonical data, provenance and risk); the Nexus Reports edition with the same code sets its own subject at commissioning, and any difference is recorded as a crosswalk.
- Which services depend on space systems?
- How exposed are orbits to congestion and debris?
- What would a severe space-weather event disable?
02Construction
Domain indices to the series index
The series index is the expert-weighted geometric mean of its domain indices, with the intervals and class rule of the methodology.
computation
How the Earth observation and space systems index is builtGraph
01Domain indices
02Series index
03Readings
100%
List
- Space-weather exposureDomain index · IDX · SPC0-10 index of space-weather exposure as the product of the space-weather hazard and space-service dependence sub-indices; mostly modelled and expert inputs, so its grade is capped.
- Earth observation and space systems indexSeries index · SERIES · XT-07Dependency on satellites for navigation, communications and observation; orbital congestion, debris and space-weather exposure.
- Country readingsOutput · OUTPUT · 195 profilesPublished with intervals and classes when the edition is released.
- Regional readingsOutput · OUTPUT · 5 regionsPublished with intervals and classes when the edition is released.
- Global readingOutput · OUTPUT · population or exposure weightedPublished with intervals and classes when the edition is released.
Not runIn progressDone
03Indices
Domain indices in this series
NXS-GRX · XT-07 · 195 profiles · 0–10 scale
Earth observation and space systems index, world
—
Values publish with the edition; the interval, class and change appear here.
| Index | Value | Change | Change % | 90% interval | Class · probability | Trend | Range |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Space-weather exposureNXS-GRX · SPC | — | — | — | — | — |
Domains read: Space environment, Technology and frontier, Infrastructure.
04Indicators
56 indicators in scope
Every indicator whose primary or secondary domain is in scope, with unit, levels and crosswalks to source code lists.
FIG 3 · Indicators in scope, by domain and sub-domain
| Indicator | Domain | Sub-domain | Component | Unit | Levels | Crosswalks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net import reliance for critical mineralsIND.ECO.concentration.critical_minerals_import_reliance | ECO | Export and import concentration | vulnerability | % | COUNTRY | |
| Seaborne trade exposed to maritime chokepointsIND.ECO.supply_chain.chokepoint_exposure | ECO | Supply-chain exposure | exposure | % | COUNTRY | |
| Flood protection design standardIND.HAZ.flood.flood_protection_standard | HAZ | Flood | coping capacity | a | COUNTRY, ADM1, CITY, SITE | |
| Built-up surface areaIND.HAZ.exposure.built_up_area | HAZ | Exposure | context | km2 | COUNTRY, ADM1, ADM2, CITY, GRID | |
| Built-up area in high-hazard zonesIND.HAZ.exposure.built_up_exposed | HAZ | Exposure | exposure | km2 | COUNTRY, ADM1, ADM2, CITY, GRID | |
| Road densityIND.ENV.land.road_density | ENV | Land and forests | hazard | km/km2 | COUNTRY, ADM1, ADM2, CITY, GRID | |
| Municipal solid waste managed in controlled facilitiesIND.ENV.pollution.msw_controlled_management.share | ENV | Pollution and waste | coping capacity | % | COUNTRY, CITY | SDG 11.6.1 EPI MSW |
| Wastewater flows safely treatedIND.WAT.quality.wastewater_safely_treated.share | WAT | Water quality | coping capacity | % | COUNTRY, CITY | SDG 6.3.1 EPI WWT |
| Severe geomagnetic storm days per yearIND.SPC.weather.severe_geomagnetic_storm_days | SPC | Space weather | hazard | d/a | GLOBAL | UNDRR_HIPS_2025 ET0101 EMDAT nat-ext-spa-geo |
| Geoelectric field amplitude at 100-year return periodIND.SPC.weather.geoelectric_field_rp100 | SPC | Space weather | hazard | V/km | COUNTRY, ADM1, GRID | |
| Strong solar radiation storm days per yearIND.SPC.weather.radiation_storm_days | SPC | Space weather | hazard | d/a | GLOBAL | UNDRR_HIPS_2025 ET0104 EMDAT nat-ext-spa-ene |
| GDP in GNSS-dependent activities, shareIND.SPC.dependence.gnss_dependent_gdp.share | SPC | Space-service dependence | exposure | % | COUNTRY, PORTFOLIO | UNDRR_HIPS_2025 ET0102 |
| Critical services relying on satellites without backup, shareIND.SPC.dependence.satellite_service_exposure.share | SPC | Space-service dependence | vulnerability | % | COUNTRY | |
| High-voltage grid in high geoelectric hazard zones, shareIND.SPC.dependence.grid_gic_exposure.share | SPC | Space-service dependence | exposure | % | COUNTRY, ADM1 | |
| Travel time to the nearest health facilityIND.HLT.system.health_facility_travel_time | HLT | Health system capacity | vulnerability | min | COUNTRY, ADM1, ADM2, CITY, GRID | |
| Urban population, share of totalIND.DEM.urbanisation.urban_share | DEM | Urbanisation | context | % | COUNTRY | WB_WDI SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS |
| Urban population growthIND.DEM.urbanisation.urban_growth | DEM | Urbanisation | vulnerability | % | COUNTRY | WB_WDI SP.URB.GROW |
| Urban population living in slumsIND.DEM.urbanisation.slum_share | DEM | Urbanisation | vulnerability | % | COUNTRY | WB_WDI EN.POP.SLUM.UR.ZS SDG 11.1.1 |
| Power outages experienced by firms in a typical monthIND.ENE.reliability.firm_power_outages | ENE | Reliability | vulnerability | /mo | COUNTRY | WB_WDI IC.ELC.OUTG |
| System average interruption duration (SAIDI)IND.ENE.reliability.saidi | ENE | Reliability | vulnerability | h/a | COUNTRY, ADM1, CITY | ISO_37120 ISO 37120:2018 |
| System average interruption frequency (SAIFI)IND.ENE.reliability.saifi | ENE | Reliability | vulnerability | /a | COUNTRY, ADM1, CITY | ISO_37120 ISO 37120:2018 |
| Critical-mineral import supplier concentrationIND.ENE.minerals.critical_mineral_import_concentration | ENE | Critical minerals | vulnerability | 1 | COUNTRY | |
| Rural population within 2 km of an all-season roadIND.INF.transport.rural_road_access | INF | Transport | coping capacity | % | COUNTRY, ADM1 | SDG 9.1.1 |
| Logistics performanceIND.INF.transport.logistics_performance | INF | Transport | coping capacity | {score} | COUNTRY | WB_WDI LP.LPI.OVRL.XQ |
| Liner shipping connectivity relative to the frontierIND.INF.transport.liner_shipping_connectivity | INF | Transport | coping capacity | % | COUNTRY | WB_WDI IS.SHP.GCNW.XQ |
| Air passengers carried per capitaIND.INF.transport.air_passengers.pc | INF | Transport | coping capacity | {passengers}/a/{person} | COUNTRY | WB_WDI IS.AIR.PSGR |
| Urban population with convenient access to public transportIND.INF.transport.public_transport_access | INF | Transport | coping capacity | % | CITY, ADM1, COUNTRY | SDG 11.2.1 ISO_37120 ISO 37120:2018 |
| Road and rail network in high-hazard zones, shareIND.INF.transport.network_exposed.share | INF | Transport | exposure | % | COUNTRY, ADM1, ADM2, CITY, GRID | |
| Individuals using the InternetIND.INF.digital.internet_users | INF | Digital connectivity | coping capacity | % | COUNTRY, ADM1, CITY | SDG 17.8.1 WB_WDI IT.NET.USER.ZS |
| Population covered by a mobile network, by technologyIND.INF.digital.mobile_network_coverage | INF | Digital connectivity | coping capacity | % | COUNTRY, ADM1 | SDG 9.c.1 |
| Fixed broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitantsIND.INF.digital.fixed_broadband | INF | Digital connectivity | coping capacity | /10*2 | COUNTRY, ADM1 | SDG 17.6.1 WB_WDI IT.NET.BBND.P2 |
| International connectivity route redundancyIND.INF.digital.international_connectivity_redundancy | INF | Digital connectivity | coping capacity | 1 | COUNTRY | |
| Hours of national-scale internet disruptionIND.INF.digital.internet_disruption_hours | INF | Digital connectivity | impact | h/a | COUNTRY | |
| Power grid resilienceIND.INF.utilities.power_grid_resilience | INF | Utilities | coping capacity | {score} | COUNTRY, ADM1, CITY | ISO_37123 ISO 37123:2019 |
| Water supply network resilienceIND.INF.utilities.water_network_resilience | INF | Utilities | coping capacity | {score} | COUNTRY, ADM1, CITY | ISO_37123 ISO 37123:2019 |
| Critical facilities with 72-hour back-up powerIND.INF.utilities.critical_facility_backup_power | INF | Utilities | coping capacity | % | COUNTRY, ADM1, CITY | ISO_37123 ISO 37123:2019 |
| Water supply assets in high-hazard zones, shareIND.INF.utilities.water_assets_exposed.share | INF | Utilities | exposure | % | COUNTRY, ADM1, ADM2, CITY, GRID | |
| Power generation and grid assets in high-hazard zones, shareIND.INF.utilities.power_assets_exposed.share | INF | Utilities | exposure | % | COUNTRY, ADM1, ADM2, CITY, GRID | |
| Lifeline facilities in high-hazard zones, shareIND.INF.utilities.lifeline_facilities_exposed.share | INF | Utilities | exposure | % | COUNTRY, ADM1, ADM2, CITY, GRID | |
| Infrastructure investment gap, share of GDPIND.INF.utilities.infrastructure_investment_gap.gdp | INF | Utilities | vulnerability | % | COUNTRY | |
| City electricity interruption hours per customerIND.INF.urban.power_interruption_hours | INF | Urban systems | vulnerability | h/a | CITY | ISO_37120 ISO 37120:2018 |
| Critical infrastructure units damaged or destroyed by disastersIND.INF.disruption.critical_infrastructure_damage | INF | Service disruption | impact | 1 | COUNTRY, ADM1 | SENDAI D-1 SDG 11.5.2 |
| Health facilities damaged or destroyed by disastersIND.INF.disruption.health_facilities_damaged | INF | Service disruption | impact | 1 | COUNTRY, ADM1 | SENDAI D-2 |
| Educational facilities damaged or destroyed by disastersIND.INF.disruption.education_facilities_damaged | INF | Service disruption | impact | 1 | COUNTRY, ADM1 | SENDAI D-3 |
| Disruptions to basic services attributed to disastersIND.INF.disruption.basic_service_disruptions | INF | Service disruption | impact | 1 | COUNTRY, ADM1 | SENDAI D-5 |
| Direct economic loss to critical infrastructure, share of GDPIND.INF.disruption.critical_infrastructure_loss.gdp | INF | Service disruption | impact | % | COUNTRY, ADM1 | SENDAI C-5 |
| Cyber incidents disrupting critical servicesIND.CYB.incidents.critical_sector_incidents | CYB | Incidents | impact | 1 | COUNTRY | |
| Gross domestic expenditure on R&D, share of GDPIND.TEC.capability.rd_expenditure.gdp | TEC | Technology capability | adaptive capacity | % | COUNTRY | SDG 9.5.1 WB_WDI GB.XPD.RSDV.GD.ZS |
| Researchers per million inhabitantsIND.TEC.capability.researchers_per_million | TEC | Technology capability | adaptive capacity | /10*6 | COUNTRY | SDG 9.5.2 WB_WDI SP.POP.SCIE.RD.P6 |
| High-technology exports, share of manufactured exportsIND.TEC.capability.high_tech_exports | TEC | Technology capability | adaptive capacity | % | COUNTRY | WB_WDI TX.VAL.TECH.MF.ZS SDG 9.b.1 |
| Semiconductor import supplier concentrationIND.TEC.concentration.semiconductor_import_concentration | TEC | Concentration and dependence | vulnerability | 1 | COUNTRY | |
| Cloud infrastructure provider concentrationIND.TEC.concentration.cloud_provider_concentration | TEC | Concentration and dependence | vulnerability | 1 | COUNTRY | |
| AI compute capacity under foreign or single-provider controlIND.TEC.ai.ai_compute_foreign_control | TEC | Artificial intelligence | vulnerability | % | COUNTRY | |
| Foundation-model provider concentrationIND.TEC.ai.foundation_model_concentration | TEC | Artificial intelligence | vulnerability | % | COUNTRY | |
| Biosafety and biosecurity oversight of high-containment laboratoriesIND.TEC.bio.biosecurity_lab_oversight | TEC | Biotechnology | coping capacity | {score} | COUNTRY | |
| Population within 15 minutes of emergency servicesIND.CRS.response.emergency_service_access | CRS | Response capacity | coping capacity | % | COUNTRY, ADM1, CITY | ISO_37120 ISO 37120:2018 |
05Hazards
Hazard families this series reads
families, each crosswalked to the UNDRR–ISC Hazard Information Profiles (2025) where a profile exists.
FIG 4 · Hazard families this series reads
| Family | Domain | Hazards | Count |
|---|---|---|---|
| Solar-terrestrial storms | Space and near-Earth | Geomagnetic storm, Solar flare radio blackout, Solar radiation storm, Ionospheric disturbance, Geomagnetically induced current, Satellite space-environment anomaly, Thermospheric drag surge, Radiation-belt electron enhancement … | 9 |
| Impacts and orbital hazards | Space and near-Earth | Near-Earth object approach, Meteorite impact, Airburst, Space debris, Orbital collision cascade, Uncontrolled re-entry, Spaceflight accident, Meteoroid stream encounter | 8 |
| AI system failure and misalignment | Frontier and exponential technology | AI malfunction in a critical service, Out-of-distribution model failure, Correlated failure of shared AI models, Reliance on fabricated AI output, Specification gaming and reward hacking, Deceptive or strategically misaligned AI, Loss of human control over advanced AI, AI self-replication and exfiltration … | 11 |
| AI security and model supply chain | Frontier and exponential technology | Theft of frontier model weights, Backdoored AI model, AI model supply-chain compromise, Prompt injection against AI agents, AI-enabled cyber offence, Attack on AI compute infrastructure, Adversarial manipulation of machine learning | 7 |
| AI misuse and capability uplift | Frontier and exponential technology | AI uplift for biological weapons, AI uplift for chemical weapons, Synthetic media at scale, Non-consensual synthetic intimate imagery, AI-driven mass persuasion, AI-enabled mass surveillance and repression, AI-enabled seizure or entrenchment of power, Malicious use of AI | 8 |
| Agentic AI acting at scale | Frontier and exponential technology | Runaway autonomous agent action, Multi-agent interaction cascade, Algorithmic market flash crash, Human deskilling and over-reliance on AI, Gradual human disempowerment by AI, Autonomous agent overreach | 6 |
| Algorithmic decision and structural harm | Frontier and exponential technology | Harmful automated decision-making, Clinical AI error, Rapid AI-driven labour displacement, Concentration of frontier AI capability, Competitive AI race and safety erosion, Degradation of the shared knowledge base, Recommender-system amplification harm, Harm from AI companions and chatbots … | 12 |
| Robotics, autonomy and autonomous weapons | Frontier and exponential technology | Lethal autonomous weapon use, Drone swarm attack, Weaponised small drone attack, Drone intrusion into protected airspace, AI-accelerated military escalation, AI in nuclear command, control and warning, Industrial and service robot injury, Autonomous vehicle system failure … | 10 |
| Biotechnology and synthetic biology | Frontier and exponential technology | Engineered pandemic pathogen, Dual-use research of concern, Benchtop DNA synthesis misuse, Biological design tool misuse, Automated biofoundry accident, Gene drive escape, Engineered organism escape into the environment, Mirror-image organism creation or release … | 10 |
| Nanotechnology and advanced materials | Frontier and exponential technology | Engineered nanomaterial exposure, High-aspect-ratio nanofibre inhalation, Nanomaterial accumulation in the environment, Uncontrolled self-replicating nanomachines, Molecular manufacturing arms race | 5 |
| Neurotechnology, human enhancement and extended reality | Frontier and exponential technology | Brain-computer interface failure, Neural device compromise, Neural data exploitation, Cognitive enhancement harm and coercion, Heritable human genome editing harm, Extended-reality physical and psychological harm, Manipulation of augmented perception | 7 |
| Quantum technology and cryptographic transition | Frontier and exponential technology | Cryptographically relevant quantum computer, Harvest-now, decrypt-later collection, Post-quantum migration failure, Quantum sensing erosion of strategic concealment | 4 |
| Climate intervention technologies | Frontier and exponential technology | Solar geoengineering termination shock, Stratospheric aerosol injection side effects, Marine cloud brightening side effects, Unilateral or rogue geoengineering deployment, Ocean fertilisation side effects, Ocean alkalinity enhancement side effects, Large-scale carbon removal land and water competition, Geological carbon storage leakage … | 11 |
| Space technology and orbital infrastructure | Frontier and exponential technology | Destructive anti-satellite strike, Non-kinetic counterspace attack, Mega-constellation orbital congestion, Constellation-wide service failure, Upper-atmosphere pollution from launches and re-entries, Satellite interference with sky observation, Back-contamination from extraterrestrial samples | 7 |
| Digital infrastructure concentration and monoculture | Frontier and exponential technology | Critical open-source dependency failure, Advanced semiconductor fabrication concentration, Digital identity and trust service failure | 3 |
| Advanced and distributed manufacturing | Frontier and exponential technology | 3D-printed and untraceable firearms, Distributed production of weapon components, Additively manufactured critical part failure | 3 |
| Energy-transition technology failures | Frontier and exponential technology | Lithium battery fire in vehicles and transport, Mass manipulation of connected energy devices, Advanced reactor material security risk, Critical mineral supply concentration | 4 |
| Distributed ledgers and digital assets | Frontier and exponential technology | Smart-contract and oracle exploit | 1 |
06Methods
Method libraries
Each method has a reference implementation or declares the specialist model, data or adapter it still needs; none is promoted beyond its evidence.
37 methods
Hazard science
Hazard Intensity Footprint Screening · Earthquake Hazard · Earthquake Ground Motion · Earthquake Rupture · Liquefaction · Landslide · Tsunami …
27 methods
Critical infrastructure and industrial systems
Asset Reliability · Process Safety · HAZOP · FMEA FMECA · Industrial Fault Tree · Industrial Event Tree · LOPA …
07Users
Who uses it
Governments and national risk agencies
Prioritise prevention and preparedness; Plan with subnational layers; Track Sendai targets; Co-develop a national index
Insurers, reinsurers and risk pools
Read hazard, exposure and protection-gap context; Run scenario and tail analytics; Study parametric index design questions
Companies and supply chains
Screen sites and suppliers; Watch chokepoints and pulse; Read country context
08Reports
Nexus Reports
- Edition code
XT-07- Edition status
- planned
- Subject
- Set by Nexus Reports at commissioning
09Cite
Cite and reuse
GCRI Canada (2026). The Global Risks Index (NXS-GRX): Earth observation and space systems series (GRX-SER-XT-07), Baseline Edition 2026. Preparatory working draft. https://risksindex.com/series/xt-07/ UNI NXS-GRX-AR-000094.
- Series key
grix:SER.XT-07:{ISO3}:{YEAR}:A- Domain keys
nis:IDX.SPC.weather.space_weather_exposure:{ISO3}:{YEAR}:A
Every country reads this series
Each country profile carries the domain indices this series is built from.
Status
The methodology, structure and definitions of The Global Risks Index are a preparatory working draft (2026), circulated for review and comment and not for implementation. No value appears until an edition is released from a governed evidence cut; values then carry intervals, classes, sources and their correction pathway. Simulators run the published methods on numbers you choose and never show a NXS-GRX value.
What NXS-GRX is not
NXS-GRX is research and risk-analytics information. It is not a credit or ESG rating and uses no rating scale, not a benchmark for financial instruments, not official statistics, not an emergency warning or official classification, and not advice. It must not be used to evaluate natural persons. Risk classes are bands on a published scale, never rankings of countries or people.
Institutions and sources
The Nexus Consortium is stewarded by three independent not-for-profit institutions: GCRI Canada as Lead Institution, Consortium Secretariat and lead contracting organization, The Global Risks Forum (GRF) and The Global Risks Alliance (GRA). Technology, infrastructure and service providers work with the Consortium at arm's length under written agreements, like every other external party in the public-private-planet model, and hold no role in its stewardship.
Every value carries the attribution of its sources, which keep their own licences. External names are cited for interoperability only. Nexus-authored text is intended for CC BY 4.0 on release.
Avis en français
La méthodologie et les définitions du NXS-GRX sont un projet de travail préparatoire (2026). Le NXS-GRX est une information de recherche et d'analyse des risques : ni notation, ni indice de référence financier, ni statistique officielle, ni alerte, ni conseil. Les classes de risque sont des bandes sur une échelle publiée, non des classements.